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Syntactic structures have been analysed in terms of constituent hierarchies and also 
in terms o f dependency relations. While these tw o  traditions have sometimes been 
presented as competing w ith  each other, there is no reason in principle why 
syntactic dependencies and constituent hierarchies should not both be part o f the 
grammar, complementing each other. Indeed, w ith in  transformational grammar and 
more specifically w ith in the Principles and Parameters theory, various dependencies 
are postulated alongside the basic constituent hierarchy analysis of sentences. The 
most salient of these are the various types of anaphoric dependencies, but other 
relations, like for example them atic, government or chain relations, have also from  
time to time been thought o f as constituting dependencies. W ithin this fram ew ork 
it remains true however, tha t the basic structural organizing principles are couched 
in terms o f constituent hierarchies, dependency relations are not taken to play a role 
here. In w hat follows I shall propose that dependency relations are more centra l to 
the grammar. I shall postulate a new module: dependency theory. The basic 
syntactic analysis of a sentence will not simply consist o f a set of elements 
arranged in a constituent hierarchy. It w ill include also a dependency structure 
defined on these elements: all syntactic elements participate in both a hierarchical 
and a dependency structure.
In section I o f th is paper I shall show that dependency theory makes it 
possible to radically sim plify the theory of phrase structure. In section II, I shall 
argue tha t the evidence tha t has standardly been taken to m otivate binary rightw ard 
branching analyses is better treated in terms of dependency relations between 
constituents.
I. Phrase Structure and Dependency 
1.1. Structural Dependencies
Let me start w ith sketching the dependency structures I have in mind. I shall 
propose tha t the concepts o f specifier-head and head-complement relations on one 
hand and dependency relations on the other should be brought together: at least 
some specifier-head and head-complement relations are in fact dependencies. 
Suppose that phrasal categories can be in a structural dependency relation w ith  
some head X. It w ill fo llow  from the principles of the theory (to be presented 
immediately below) tha t there is a single category on which the head X directly 
depends, the spec of X, and a single category which directly depends on the head, 
the comp of X. (Notice tha t spec and comp are not defined hierarchically here, but 
in terms of dependencies.) I shall call the spec-head and the head-comp 
dependencies direct structural dependencies. Direct structural dependencies are 
then relations between a head and a phrase.
Spec-head dependencies can be taken to be instantiated by checking
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relations, -tak ing  the head or its checking features to depend on the spec or on 
the relevant features o f the spec. A typica l comp-head dependency is object theta 
assignment/selection.
Turning now to the  principles o f dependency theory I assume firs t tha t direct 
structura l dependencies interact transitively creating indirect structural 
dependencies. I assume also an adapted version o f Kayne's (1993) Linear 
Correspondence Axiom . I shall take the principles o f Precedence and Totality to 
regulate the relationship between the linear ordering of terminals and the 
dependency relations holding between nodes dominating them. I give a somewhat 
informal statement in (1) and (2):
(1) Precedence
if x structurally depends on y then the terminals dominated by y precede 
the terminals dominated by x
(2) Totality
all terminals must be ordered by the Precedence condition on 
structural dependencies
Williams (1992) has independently argued for a precedence condition on anaphoric 
dependencies. Precedence in (1) can also be thought o f as an application of his 
condition to structural dependencies.
In addition I assume that no redundant direct structural (spec-head or head- 
comp) dependencies are allowed: there can be no direct dependencies beyond those 
that fu lly  determine the precedence relations between terminals.
(3) Non-redundancy
there are no d irect structural dependencies that are not required to satisfy 
Tota lity
The principles o f dependency theory entail that direct structural dependencies 
always link adjacent categories, they cannot skip over them. This is not d ifficu lt to 
see. Consider the case where there is some element, oc, intervening between the 
tw o  members of a d irect dependency, as in (4):
(4) YP oc X b.
Such a configuration v io lates either Tota lity or Non-redundancy. Totality requires 
tha t there be some dependencies that force oc to precede the terminals dominated 
by X and fo llow  the term inals dominated by YP in (4). Suppose that such structural 
dependencies are present as in (4b). Then X indirectly depends on YP by virtue of 
these and the fact tha t the terminal dominated by X follows the terminals 
dominated by YP will be ensured. Thus the structural dependency of X on YP is 
unnecessary to order the terminals dominated by them and therefore it w ill violate 
Non-redundacy.
So spec-head and head-comp dependencies presuppose adjacency between
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the linked elements. This has tw o immediate consequences. First a head can have 
only a single spec and a single comp and second the spec and the comp must be 
on d iffe rent sides o f the head. Both consequences fo llow  since only one category 
can be adjacent to  a head on each side.
There is a difference standardly made between specifier-head and head- 
complement relations tha t I shall assume and exploit. Head-complement relations 
are lexically determined, -these  are taken to always hold between lexically related 
sister constituents. I take head-comp relations to be a special case of head- 
complement relations covered by the same generalization. Spec-head 
relations/dependencies on the other hand are much freer. They can hold between 
lexically, and (as I shall assume following essentially Pesetsky 1992) even 
semantically, unrelated categories. I shall therefore take spec-head dependencies 
to be in principle freely assignable, -a lthough subject to certain restrictions to be 
discussed below. The axioms of dependency theory will ensure tha t th is does not 
result in overgeneration.
Notice now tha t if spec and comp were understood in both hierarchical and 
dependency terms then dependency theory would force hierarchical structures to 
be s tric tly  binary branching: there can be only one spec and one comp associated 
w ith any head. But since I understand spec and comp of a head X as categories in 
a direct structural dependency relation w ith X, these considerations do not exclude 
structures in which a head has more than one specifiers or complements. As long 
as the additional maximal projections do not intervene between the spec or comp 
and the head, there can be dependency structures that do not violate the axioms. 
For example in (5a) the head X has its spec and comp dependency (to QP and from 
RP respectively) and in addition it has another complement:
As just noted, spec-head dependencies are assigned freely, hence unless ruled out 
by the dependency axioms there will be spec-head dependencies tha t do not 
correspond to the configurational spec-head relations of standard structural 
analyses. Such a spec-head dependency from the head of YP to RP, the comp of 
X can provide the required ordering for the terminals dominated by YP in (5a).
We can define the complement of X as any sister category tha t ( + im­
properly) contains some element (directly or indirectly) structurally dependent on 
X. In a parallel w ay any sister category o f X ' that ( + /- properly) contains some 
element on which X depends will be a specifier o f X. The follow ing four points need 
to be mentioned in connection w ith  these definitions. First I shall argue below for 
the elim ination of the X'-level, and accordingly I should substitute X for X ' in the 
definition o f the specifier. Secondly note tha t a spec is not necessarily a specifier 
in the present theory: specifiers but not spec's are defined as sister nodes. Thus for 
example RP in (5a) is the spec of Y, since Y directly structurally depends on it, but 
RP is not the specifier of Y: it is outside YP. Thirdly, I assume that in a structure 
like (5a) if RP is a PP, the head P of this PP can always reanalyse w ith  the head X 
forming a complex head whose comp is the comp of P. Thus if the head of the
(5)a. YP
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sister phrase (corresponding to YP in (5a)) fo llow ing this PP structurally depends on 
the comp of P, this second sister w ill still satisfy the definition of complement of 
X: it indirectly depends on the reanalysed X + P. Fourthly note also tha t the system 
allow s not only for multiple complements but also for multiple specifiers. For 
example in a structure like (5b), where YP is the spec of X and both QP and YP are 
specifiers o f X, the axioms of dependency theory can be satisfied. Similarly to the 
m ultip le complement case of (5a), a spec-head dependency between QP and Y can 
order the terminals in the tw o  specifiers.
(5)b. Q P ^ X T ^  V ^ Z P ] ^  *X
Consider next the choice between spec-head-comp and comp-head-spec 
w ord orders. The assumption that the dependent element must fo llow  the one it 
depends on is a natural one given general processing considerations. Thus if spec 
depends on the head and the head on comp then Precedence entails a comp-head- 
spec word order, while if the comp depends on the head and the head on the spec 
then Precedence forces the spec-head-comp order. Spec-head relations give no 
stra ightforw ard clue as to which is the correct choice, but comp clearly is a 
function  of the head rather than the other way around. Hence comp depends on, 
and therefore by Precedence follows, the head. Since, as we have seen, the spec 
must be on the opposite side of the head the word order must be spec-head-comp. 
It then follows also by Precedence that the head must depend on the spec. If 
complements and specifiers are also defined in dependency terms as just 
suggested, then all specifiers will precede and complements fo llow  the head, -again 
as a consequence of Precedence.
1.2. A Minimal Theory o f Phrase Structure
Let us next turn to some of those predictions o f Kayne's LCA for phrase structure 
tha t the proposed dependency theory does not reproduce. Kayne's LCA is violated 
by XP 's that have no X° head as in (6a) and ones that have more than one such 
head as for example in (6b). ((6b) can also be thought of as a structure where the 
com plem ent of a head is not a phrase but another head.)







X 1 YP X 2
Dependency theory on the other hand has no such consequence. The dependency
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structure in (6b), where YP to X 1 is a head-comp and X 2 to  YP is a spec-head 
dependency, does not violate the principles of dependency theory. As fo r (6a), if 
ZP has no specifiers then a spec-head dependency from Z to YP w ill order the 
terminals appropriately. Nothing forces the simultaneous presence of a dependency 
between Y and ZP that would result in a violation. It seems to  me however tha t the 
fact tha t dependency theory does not entail that a phrase must immediately 
dominate a unique head is in fact an advantage, since it eliminates a potential 
redundancy.
Since phrases and their heads share properties, the assumption tha t phrases 
are in some sense projected by their heads seems ineliminable. The fa c t tha t a 
phrase must have a unique head w ill fo llow  if we assume tha t phrases can only 
arise through projection and that furthermore all heads must project phrases. Since 
the latter statem ent is false for word-internal heads, a minimal statem ent o f this 
would have to  be along the lines of (7), which I shall call the Principle o f Phrasal 
Projection.
(7) Principle of Phrasal Projection (PPP)
a. Every non word-internal head must project a d istinct phrase
b. Every phrase is projected by a (non word-internal) head
The PPP expresses the idea that syntactic categorial structure is projected from  the 
lexicon. This involves tw o assumptions. Clause (a) o f the PPP states tha t a 
precondition for a lexical element to enter the syntactic structure is for it to  project 
some nonlexical category, ie. a phrase. Clause (b) states that all syntactic 
categories are related to the lexicon: they must either come from the lexicon or be 
projected by categories which do. That a phrase must have a head fo llow s  now 
from clause (b) of the PPP, that is from the fact that all phrases are projected by 
their heads. That a phrase must not have more than one head will fo llo w  from 
clause (a).
A basic property of projection is that it is local: a phrasal node projected by 
a head is always near to this head. Assume that the relevant notion o f locality is 
immediate domination: the phrase projected by a head must immediately dominate 
this head. Then a phrase HP will immediately dominate a unique head H, —its own. 
Any other head must be immediately dominated by the phrase that this o ther head 
projected, necessarily distinct from  HP as we have seen.
Consider next the converse statement: that a head projects a unique phrase. 
Optimally th is should also hold, since it would radically sim plify the theory o f phrase 
structure. Suppose that it does. Let us first ask why this should be so. We have 
already seen that a head must project a phrase, so we only need an account o f why 
it cannot project more than one. Uniqueness of the projected phrase will 
immediately fo llow  if the locality relation between the head and the projected 
phrase is understood strictly, say as immediate domination defined as in (8) (where 
x,y,z are categories and domination is irreflexive): 8
(8) x immediately dominates y iff x dominates y and for all z d is tinct from  x
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if z dominates y then z dominates x
Locality as in (8) rules out multiple projection by one head not only in the 
standard configuration of (9a) but also in the "inversely branching" (9b).
(9) a. XP XP XP
It thus fo llow s also that a head can project only a single phrase, since only a single 
phrase can immediately dominate the head that projected it.
I thus assume that in the context o f the theory that assumes presyntactic 
projection o f phrases, the biunique relation between phrases and non word internal 
heads projecting them fo llow s from the PPP and the locality requirement on 
projection. Optimally, the PPP and the locality requirement should exhaust the 
theory of phrase structure. Suppose tha t they do. Then the theory of phrase 
structure requires that every XP consists of a unique head X and an arbitrary 
number of o ther phrases. As we have seen, dependency theory ensures that only 
one of the included phrases can serve as a spec and only one as comp, the 
designated firs t complement. The spec and the specifiers w ill precede and the comp 
and the other complements w ill fo llow  the head for the reasons given.
Current theories o f phrase structure diverge from this simple picture which 
on ly contains the configuration where an XP dominates a head and a number of 
o ther XP's in tw o  major but related respects. An intermediate X ' level is assumed 
between the head and the phrasal node and the configuration of adjunction is 
allowed in addition. These tw o  additions can be reduced to one if, as proposed by 
Kayne (1993), the intermediate X '-level is treated as the lower segment of 
adjunction. But the ad hoc segment-category distinction and the attendant 
com plications in the defin ition of c-command necessary in this theory make a 
stipulative configuration ou t o f adjunction. Given such complications, adjunction 
is clearly not a notion "draw n from the domain of (virtual) conceptual necessity" to 
use Chom sky's (1993) term s.
W ithin the present fram ework word-external adjunction is both impossible 
and unnecessary. The fact tha t adjunction is not a possible option word-externally, 
fo llow s immediately from  the PPP. Since no segment-category distinction is 
postulated, adjunction w ould by definition create a new category w ithout a head 
projecting it, violating the PPP. There are at least tw o  alternative structures for 
phrases standardly treated as adjoined. First since multiple specifiers are allowed, 
an adjoined category can be analysed as an additional specifier. This would be a 
natural approach for example to  multiple wh-elements in phrases headed by a + WH 
category. (Notice that the "head of COMP" (Lasnik and Saito 1984) ie. the 
substituted wh-phrase in the specifer o f the + WH C under standard treatments can
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still be distinguished from the other "adjoined" wh-phrases: th is element is the spec 
o f the + WH head underthe dependency module, while the other wh-categories are 
only specifiers of this head but they do not serve as its spec.) A lternative ly an 
adjoined category can also be taken to be the specifier o f some higher head. Under 
this option, instead of left-adjunction of XP to YP as in (10a), we can have the 
configuration in (10b) w ith  the higher head Z which is either invisible fo r selection 
(selectional requirements are satisfied by the lower head Y) or it has the ab ility  to 
satisfy the same selectional requirements as the lower head Y. (Apparently fronted 







Thus we can dispense w ith  phrasal adjunction in general, - a  welcome result for the 
reasons noted. See also Sportiche (1994) who reaches the conclusion 
independently, that adjunction does not exist in (presumably word-external) syntax.
Chomsky 1994 develops a theory that radically restricts word-external 
adjunction to cases where the target has no theta role (expletive-associate chains) 
or where in his derivational system the adjunct is not present at LF (intermediate 
traces deleted by LF and "semantically vacuous" scrambling where LF 
reconstruction eliminates the scrambled element). These cases do not seem to 
provide strong motivation for retaining this configuration. LF adjunction of the 
associate to its expletive chain-mate is a problematic and probably unnecessary 
operation cf. eg. Brody 1993. The necessity of adjoined intermediate traces in non- 
uniform chains is equally moot (cf. eg. Manzini 1992). As for scrambling, 
Chomsky suggests tha t LF reconstruction will provide an account of the contrast 
he finds between (11a) and (11b). Here the expectation is that (11a), the adjunct 
case is worse, since forced reconstruction in this example w ill create a 
configuration that violates principle C. Since the fronted phrase "w hich pictures of 
John's brother" is not an adjunct in (11b), this example will not be similarly 
excluded:
(11) a. Pictures of Johnx's brother, hex never expected tha t I would buy
b. Which pictures of Johnx's brother did hex expect tha t I would buy
c. Near Johnx, hex saw a snake
Note first that if topicalization is treated as adjunction then in the minimalist
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fram ew ork it is quite unclear how the PF presence of the topicalized element in the 
fronted position gets triggered. (For a substitution analysis of this construction cf. 
Watanabe 1 992.) Secondly, it is not clear if there really is a contrast between (11a) 
and (11b), especially in v iew  of well known examples like (11c), that appear to 
a llow  coreference. Third ly forced reconstruction o f adjuncts would loose the 
explanation of the contrasts like those between (1 2a) and (12b) or (12c) and (12d), 
w h ich  depend precisely on forced reconstruction of the selected argument but not 
o f the unselected category internal to the fronted phrase (cf. Lebaux 1989, and 
Chomsky 1993, Brody to  appear, for d ifferent ways of instantiating this idea). If 
topicalization is adjunction and adjuncts are reconstructed then (12a,b) should 
con trast w ith  (12c,d) rather than (1 2a) and (12c) w ith  (12b) and (1 2d):
(12) a. W hich claim tha t Johnx made did hex deny
b . ?*Whose claim tha t Johnx was asleep did hex deny
c. The claim that Johnx made about this, hex later denied
d . ?*The claim that Johnx was asleep all day hex later denied
Thus the evidence fo r an account involving forced reconstruction of elements 
adjoined to semantically nonvacuous categories seems unconvincing. It therefore 
cannot support the more general claim tha t word-external adjunction —although 
under restricted c ircum stances- exists in syntax.
Consider next the question of the intermediate X'-level. If adjunction does not 
exist, then clearly this category type cannot be treated as a segment o f adjunction. 
Suppose that there is no intermediate X ' level. Then the question arises, how 
spec(ifiers) and comp(lements) can be distinguished. We could do this w ithou t 
postulating either adjunction structures or the existence of categories that are 
neither word-level nor maximal projections by an analysis partly in the spirit o f 
Larson's (1988) work. Suppose that we take a phrase to consist of an internal XP 
tha t includes the head and its complements and an external XP-shell that contains 
an em pty head and the specifier or specifiers of X as in (13). The empty head X 1 
and the lexical head X2 are then taken to form  a unit, — a head-chain. (The tree in
(13) is only partly Larsonian, since although it involves an empty shell, it is not 
binary branching.)
We could then take the specifier to be tha t sister of the higher head that does not 
contain the lower head, w hile  the complement(s) would be simply the sister(s) o f 
the lower head.
I do not th ink that th is solution is the correct one however. Larson's empty
shell approach to the evidence that is generally taken to motivate binary branching 
structures is incompatible w ith  the generalization that categorial projection and the
(13)
spec X 1 XP2
X 2 comp
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selectional properties o f a head must be satisfied in the root position o f its chain 
(Brody to appear). This problem would carry over to the analysis of the phrase in
(13) . In this case the subject is not in the same phrase (XP2) tha t contains the root 
position of the head-chain. The spec in (13) would therefore have to be selected 
from the position of X 1, not the root position X2of the [X1, X 2 ] chain. Furthermore 
the higher head X 1 projects an XP, again in spite of not being in the root position 
of its chain.
The generalization that Larsonian empty shell analyses o f multiple 
complementation violate was captured in the pre-minimalist fram ework by the 
concept o f deep structure. Although the existence of deep structure as a d istinct 
level of representation is quite dubious there are not many reasons to doubt the 
existence of the generalization it expressed (Brody 1993, to appear, see also 
Chomsky 1993, 1994 for relevant discussion). This generalization is a major and 
a pervasive one. Not only categorial projection and thematic selectional 
requirements, but syntactic and semantic selection in general hold invariably in the 
root positions of chains. Thus for example a verb V raised to some higher 
functional projection, say C, never forces the spec and complements o f th is  head 
to satisfy the selectional requirements of V. I argued in earlier w ork tha t an 
appropriately formulated projection principle is compatible w ith a m inimalist 
fram ework and is in fact necessary to ensure the generalization that selection and 
categorial projection holds invariably in the root positions of chains. Thinking of the 
relevant features as "projectional" ie. as being projected from the lexicon, I 
proposed tha t the projection principle requires that projectional features m ust hold 
in and be satisfied by the root positions of chains:
(14) Generalized Projection Principle (GPP)
Projectional requirements can involve only the root positions of chains
(ie. they can hold in, and be satisfied by root positions only)
Thus I take the projection principle to require not only tha t the relevant features 
hold only in root positions but also that they must be satisfied by root positions. 
Given this further natural generalization the projection principle entails tha t only the 
root positions of (XP-)chains can be thematic (ie. that movement cannot land in a 
theta position) - th e  Main Thematic Condition.
The projectional features include centrally the categorial features o f a head. 
Phrasal nodes are projected by heads, so categorial features are under the 
jurisdiction of the projection principle. As expected, these also take e ffect invariably 
in the root position of the relevant head chain: a verb forces the presence of a 
phrasal node VP in the root position of its chain, but not in any higher position. A 
V raised to C for example will not turn the CP into a VP. On the other hand a 
categorial feature can apparently be assigned to a phrase in non-root positions in 
XP-chains. I assume that this is because categorial features, in contrast 
to selectional features, are assigned to categories and not to positions. Both types 
of features are assigned though through the position occupied by the re levant head, 
hence by the GPP only in root positions of chains. The generalization expressed by 
the GPP in (14) thus captures the behaviour o f categorial and various selectional
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features and in addition it entails also the Main Thematic Condition. Since Larsonian 
em pty  shells violate this pervasive generalization, the attem pt to find an alternative 
approach seems well-m otivated.
One possibility is to  assume that the higher head creating the "em pty shell" 
is in fact not empty but is itself an abstract lexical element, one that carries the 
appropriate categorial features and selectional requirements of the head whose 
features are shared between a number o f head positions (This consequence of 
Larson's approach is noted in Brody to appear.) Multiple complement verbs under 
a Larsonian analysis would all require such a decomposition treatm ent. Consider 
applying this treatment to  the  present problem of eliminating the intermediate X '- 
level in terms of a structure like (13). If X is decomposed into X 1 and X2 and 
categories standardly taken as sisters o f X ' and sisters of X are distinguished as 
s isters of X1 and sisters o f X 2then also simple transitive and intransitive heads must 
decompose into two heads. The verb see would have to be composed of an agent 
selecting segment and a non-agentive SEE, something like the passive was seen. 
W hile  this is logically possible, there appears to be little independent evidence for 
proceeding along these lines. Furthermore w ith heads tha t assign no theta role to 
the ir subjects, specifier and complements could be distinguished only at the price 
o f postulating a fully empty head. For example seem would have to decompose into 
a higher head that does no t select its subject and which does not appear to 
contribu te in any other w ay and a lower one which is exactly like seem. This seems 
to  reduce the approach to vacuity.
But there is no immediate need to explore this avenue further. As far as the 
intermediate X'-level is concerned, we in fact already have the alternative solution. 
Given dependency theory, the asymmetry between spec and comp is ensured 
w ith o u t a difference in the ir c-command relations to each other. Thus according to 
the  analysis tha t results from  the interaction of dependency theory and the minimal 
theo ry  of phrase structure based on the PPP, the basic structure o f an XP will be
(15):
In (15) YP, the comp asymmetrically depends on the head X, and X asymmetrically 
depends on ZP, the spec. Since, more generally, complements and specifiers were 
also defined in dependency term s, it is unnecessary to express this asymmetry also 
in the  hierarchical structure. In sum the minimal, "virtua lly conceptually necessary" 
the o ry  of constituency can be assumed which requires nothing beyond that heads 
p ro ject phrases and phrases be projected by heads, —and which entails that a 
phrase contains its head and optionally an arbitrary number of other phrases.




Chomsky (1994) rejects the assumption that "certain features (categorial features) 
project from  a terminal element to form a head, then on to form  higher categories 
w ith  d ifferent bar levels". There are at least tw o assumptions involved here: (a) 
categorial features project to label higher categories and (b) higher categories have 
different bar levels. But he assumes at the same time that the operation o f Merge: 
"pro ject[s j one of the objects to which it applies, its head becoming the label o f the 
complex form ed". Thus assumption (a) that categorial features project is in fac t not 
rejected, categorial labeling is accomplished by Merge, which in addition carries out 
the task o f joining (projected and unprojected) elements. It is assumption (b) that 
projection creates different bar levels that is rejected. Following Muysken (1982), 
Chomsky assumes that bar level status (minimal, maximal, both or neither) is 
contextually determined: a maximal projection is one that does not project further, 
a minimal projection is the lexical element itself, an intermediate projection is one 
that is neither maximal nor minimal.
W ith in the minimal theory of phrase structure proposed here, there are no 
intermediate projection levels, and thus a category is either a head or a phrase. 
Under a set-theoretical formalization these would correspond to  a non-set element 
and a set respectively. Thus there remains no 'bar level sta tus ' and therefore no 
question as to how this is to be determined, -a n  unprojected element is a head and 
a projected one is a phrase. Note also that since branching is taken to  be n-ary 
there is no need to restrict (directly or indirectly) the principles building syntactic 
structures to binary operations. Given the simplest assumption about branching, 
namely tha t it is in principle unrestricted, there will be both unary and more than 
binary branching structures.
The PPP allows a further simplification. As we have seen clause (b) of the 
PPP ensures tha t every phrase must immediately dominate a head tha t projects it 
and clause (a) entails in the context of presyntactic projection that th is  head is 
unique. This means that there is no need to label phrases at all, phrasal labels can 
be thought o f as only informal notation. ocP becomes shorthand fo r a phrase 
headed by °c. The PPP thus eliminates the indeterminacy of labeling present for 
example in Chomsky's (1994) system, where the operation of Merge applied to tw o 
categories has to specify which of the tw o  projected. The phrase structure 
becomes genuinely "bare": phrases correspond to sets whose elements are either 
other phrases/sets or non-set elements/heads. The additional and quite unnatural 
complication of allowing some of the elements in these sets to be labels can be 
dispensed w ith .
Recall tha t word-internal heads do not need to project phrases, hence such 
heads m ust be exempted from this requirement. Clause (a) o f the PPP was 
formulated accordingly. Clause (b) was stated symmetrically: all phrases must be 
projected by word-external heads. This has the important effect o f excluding 
phrases adjoined to heads: such phrases would necessarily be projected by word- 
internal heads. (I suggested in an earlier version of this paper th a t phrasal 
adjunction is ruled out by a PF-requirement: words cannot contain phrasal 
boundaries at PF, - c f .  also Chomsky 1994 for essentially the same proposal. But 
Gugliemo Cinque points out that examples like "his out o f this world attitude",
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where the stress pattern indicates a word-internal phrase, may counterexemplify 
th is  analysis. Such examples are in fact strongly suggestive that a PF condition is 
no t the relevant one, since they seem to  result from a marginal or ungrammatical 
construction being saved by the device o f creating a PF phrasal word. The condition 
prohibiting such configurations would therefore appear to be stric tly  syntactic and 
no t phonological in nature.)
Since the PPP is not sensitive to whether a head is in the root position of its 
chain, it provides a straightforward answer also to w hy "moved" heads (ie. heads 
in non-root positions) cannot substitute into or adjoin to maximal projections. This 
is because the resulting configurations equally violate the PPP: such heads are not 
dominated by a phrase projected by them.
As w e have seen, the GPP ensures that a head in a non chain-root position 
cannot project, and thus in particular it cannot project a phrase. Suppose that such 
a "m oved" head H adjoined or substituted to some phrase avoids exclusion by the 
PPP by projecting a phrasal node HP. There are tw o  options to  exclude: the 
projected phrase HP may be either internal to the phrase to which H substituted/ 
adjoined or it may force the  category label of the target phrase or segment to be 
HP. Both options are of course excluded by the GPP: projection is restricted to root 
positions. Thus the GPP and the PPP together ensure that "m oved" non chain-root 
heads must invariably be head-internal. It is important to see that there is no direct 
contrad iction between the PPP and the GPP. They only create a contradiction for 
w ord-external heads in non chain root positions. The PPP requires all word-external 
heads to project a phrase and the GPP restricts all projection to root positions of 
chains. Hence word-external heads that are not in root positions can neither project 
nor not project: they cannot exist.
Let us turn finally to  the question of the explanation of the tw o non­
dependency principles involved in this account, the PPP and the GPP. As for the 
PPP there does not seem to  be much to  explain. This principle states that all and 
on ly word-external heads have a phrase projecting property and tha t there is no 
lexicon-independentsyntactic category: phrases must be projected by heads. These 
seem to be natural and minimal assumptions.
In Brody (to appear) an explanation o f the GPP is provided along the following 
lines. The question is w hy checking of projectional features has to hold and (at 
least in the case of selectional features also be satisfied in) the most deeply 
embedded position in the chain. Take a configuration in which this is not the case, 
where a head is in a chain in which it projects (categorially and/or selects) from a 
non-root position or where an XP is selected in a non-root position of its chain. 
Suppose tha t a head can on ly project and an XP can only be selected in a single 
position in a chain. (This may be a sim plification, cf. Brody to appear). Suppose 
however also that all positions in a chain must be projectionally identified. An 
assignee position is so identified if it has the appropriate feature while the assigner 
position is identified if it has some feature indicating that proper assignment has 
taken place. Suppose fina lly that feature percolation in chains can only take place 
bo ttom  to top , it is s tric tly  upward directional. It fo llows that the projectional
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feature must be assigned to the most deeply embedded position in the assignee 
chain, otherw ise lower positions in this chain will not be projectionally identified. 
Similarly the projectional feature must be assigned from the most deeply embedded 
position of the assigner chain, otherwise the feature indicating the satisfaction of 
the projectional requirement cannot percolate to all members o f the assigner chain.
The requirement that feature percolation in chains is s tric tly  upward is in 
effect the representational equivalent of the principle excluding lowering. In a 
derivational fram ework a representation that is in violation o f the GPP could have 
arisen in tw o  ways. Either through raising in violation of the derivational equivalent 
o f the GPP prohibiting movement into a position that involves projectional features 
or through lowering from this position. Downward spreading of the projectional 
features in a representational theory appears to correspond to a lowering in a 
derivational system. This needs to be excluded. But since projectional feature 
checking like all feature assignment by heads can only involve a single position, the 
GPP now reduces to the principle that all positions in a chain need to  be 
projectionally identified.
(Notice tha t while the GPP follows from simple assumptions once the 
equivalent o f lowering is excluded in a representational theory, the same is no t true 
in a derivational system. Excluding lowering rules would not help to explain why 
raising into a projectional position is impossible. See the appendix for a discussion 
of Chomsky's (1994) alternative explanation of the effects o f the GPP.)
II. Dependency and Binary Branching 
11.1. Dual Derivations and Dependency
Asymmetric behaviour of anaphoric relations in the VP can be analysed in term s of 
precedence in addition to c-command. For example the paradigm in (16) through 
(19) (from Pesetsky 1992) can be accounted for if we assume that the antecedent, 
in addition to the c-command and locality requirements, must in these cases also 
precede the anaphor.
(16) Sue spoke to these peoplex about each o th e r 's  friends in Bill's house
(17) a. John spoke to Mary about these peoplex in each o th e r 's  houses
b. Mary danced w ith  these peoplex in each o th e r 's  hometowns
(18) *Sue spoke to each o th e r 's  friends about these peoplex
(19) a. *Sue spoke to Mary about each o th e r 's  flaws in these houses 
b. *M ary danced in each o th e r 's  cities w ith these mayorsx.
The curious conjunction of precede and c-command can be eliminated in term s of 
c-command defined on binary rightward branching structures, (eg. Larson 1988, 
Pesetsky 1992, Kayne 1993) Given the evidence discussed above against the 
Larsonian em pty shell approach from the projection principle, I shall adopt as a 
basis for discussion the analysis in Pesetsky 1992. Given binary branching trees like 
those in (20), the antecedent w ill c-command the anaphor in all and only the 
grammatical examples in (16) through (19): precedence is eliminated.
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As Pesetsky emphasizes, although such structures appear to be motivated 
in various ways, they do not provide the appropriate constituent structure for 
movement/chain relations. As (21) shows, on many of the constituents in (20) no 
non-trivial chain can be form ed. The members of the chains in (22) and (23) are not 
constituents of the b inary branching tree, but only of the more traditional 
representation in (24), —the examples are again Pesetsky's, w ith  minor 
m odifications:
(21) a. * [T o  John about himself] Mary spoke_
b. * l wonder [to w ho m  on Tuesday] Mary spo ke__
(22) a. [To which adults] Sue showed the k id s_on each other's birthdays?
b. [To none of the offic ia ls ] did Sue send m oney_on each other's birthdays
c. [On which table] did John put the book _during its construction?
d. [To the children] w ere given b o o k s_on each other's birthdays.
(23) a. ... and [give the book to them in the garden] he did [_on each other's
birthdays]
b. ... and [give the book to them] he did [_in each other's garden]
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Thus there appears to be systematic evidence for both types o f phrasal 
organization. Accordingly, Pesetsky postulates that sentences have tw o  parallel 
derivations, one involving binary branching and the other more traditional trees, his 
"cascade" and "layered" representations. He suggests that selectional and other 
related restrictions hold in both derivations and postulates a set o f correspondence 
principles to  relate them. But this means that the approaches in terms o f binary 
branching structures to the problem of anaphora are not fully successful e ither since 
they create another unexplained duplication.
Dependency theory captures the operative relations of binary branching 
analyses and thus it makes such analyses dispensable. In discussing the relation 
between dependency theory and the theory of phrase structure I have been 
concentrating on structures where a phrase contains only tw o  maximal projections, 
a spec and a comp. Let us now consider more closely the situation where an XP 




give the book to them in the garden
In order to  ensure the correct constituent structure, I analyse the non 
subcategorized PP in (25) as a sister of a higher head. (Recall tha t I assume the 
nonexistence of phrasal adjunction.) Single line arrows indicate the lexically 
determined head-comp dependencies. These relations leave the tw o  PP's " to  them" 
and "in the garden" unordered w ith respect to each other and the rest o f the 
structure. Let us assume that structural dependency relations cannot cross 
argument (CP and DP) category boundaries. One of the ways in which (25) can 
satisfy the axioms of dependency theory is if the tw o spec-head dependencies 
(indicated by double line arrows) are present in the structure. This w ill ensure that 
the structure expresses both the constituency facts and the asym metry show n by 
the behaviour o f anaphoric elements.
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Given the assumption that anaphoric relations are defined over dependency 
structures, it is then necessary to formulate the dependency equivalent of principle 
A. For th is a dependency equivalent o f c-command is necessary. This relation, c- 
dependence, is defined in a parallel w ay to c-command in (26). C-command is 
restated fo r comparison in (27) and the dependency version of principle A is given 
in (28) :
(26) y c-depends on x if f  y depends on x or
z contains y and z depends on x
(27) x c-commands y if f  x, y are sisters or
z contains y and x , z are sisters
(28) Principle A
An anaphor must c-depend on an antecedent in its local domain
Since all dependencies are right to le ft by the Precedence requirement, it is 
easy to see that the principle A in (28) w ill be violated by the ungrammatical 
examples in (18) and (19). In contrast, those in (16) and (1 7) w ill satisfy (28), since 
in each of these the anaphor is in a DP tha t indirectly depends on the antecedent 
o f this anaphor. It is clear then that the analysis in (25) can account for both the 
constituency and the anaphoric relations exhibited by multiple complement VPs.
Notice that there are alternative dependency structures for (25). The spec- 
head dependency from the preposition in could lead not to the DP them but to the 
PP or VP dominating this DP. In sentences like (16) and (17) similar dependency 
structures would violate principle A: under such analyses the anaphor would not c- 
depend on its antecedent. If we assumed that only argument categories (DPs and 
CPs) can serve as non-derived (chain root) spec nodes (Kayne 1984, Pesetsky 
1992) then only the dependency analysis indicated in (25) would be legitimate, this 
principle w ou ld rule out the  alternatives w ith PP or VP spec's. But anaphoric 
relations appear to provide no motivation fo r adopting the restriction: principle A for 
example can be satisfied if there is at least one dependency analysis of the 
structure th a t satisfies it. Similarly for other anaphoric requirements.
For another illustration of the interaction of dependency theory w ith  the 
multiple branching phrase structure, consider the examples usually taken to involve 
Heavy Shift in (29):
(29) John offended t [by no t recognizing pg] [his favourite uncle from India]
(30) We gave t  to them on Friday [copies o f the reports on each other]
This operation exhibits both raising and lowering effects. The fact tha t it appears 
to  license parasitic gaps as in (29) shows tha t the shifted phrase is higher than its 
trace. On the other hand the  fact that an anaphoric elements is licensed inside the 
shifted phrase whose antecedent is not higher than the trace of the shifted phrase 
suggests lowering.
W illiams (1990, 1992) has denied that Heavy Shift has properties of A '- 
chains, arguing against the claim that it licenses parasitic gaps. He takes examples
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like (29) to be derived by the operation of Right node raising. His evidence is tha t 
constructions w ith  parasitic gaps like (29) allow stranded prepositions, as in (31). 
As he points out the option of stranding prepositions is a property characteristic o f 
Right node raising but not of Heavy Shift:
(31) John yelled at t, before punishing pg, all of those campers
(32) John talked to, and I yelled at, Peter
(33) *l talked to, about Mary, his favourite uncle
Although this data might suggest a way of avoiding the conclusion tha t 
Heavy Shift can license parasitic gaps, it clearly does not force this conclusion. This 
evidence is equally compatible w ith the claim that parasitic gaps are licensed both 
by Heavy Shift and by Right node raising, although prepositions are strandable only 
by this latter operation. Examples like (34) show that the conclusion that there is 
some operation (presumably Heavy Shift) that has both raising and lowering 
properties cannot be avoided in the way Williams suggests. These examples exh ib it 
both types of properties (leftward parasitic gap licensing and rightward anaphor 
binding) simultaneously:
(34) a. I read to them, w ithout carefully checking pg, several reports on 
each other
b. We read to each boy, after discussing pg in private, a report on his 
activities.
If anaphora is a dependency relation and the licencing of (syntactic) variables 
-w h e th e r ordinary traces or parasitic gaps- is not, then the modular analysis tha t 
postulates a dependency structure again predicts exactly the observed facts. As the 
structure of (34a) in (35) shows, the trace and the parasitic gaps are c-commanded 
by the shifted phrase but the anaphoric element inside the shifted phrase can c- 
depend on its antecedent (I assume w ith Pesetsky that the shifted phrase is a PP):
Thus the modular interaction of dependency theory w ith  the minimal theory 
o f phrase structure can reconstruct Pesetsky's dual derivation analysis, w ithou t the 
duplicate selectional restrictions and correspondence principles o f his analysis. But 
perhaps even more importantly, the interaction of dependency and phrase structure 
theory is naturally taken to provide a classification of syntactic relations. Given the 
Precedence principle, we expect precedence or binary branching effects between
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tw o  elements just in case that there is a dependency relation between them.
11.2. Dependency and Precedence
Typical such cases invo lve anaphoric dependencies: anaphors under principle A, 
polarity item licensing or pronominal bound anaphora. Consider pronominal bound 
anaphora. Williams (1992 , 1994) proposed an account of WCO and other related 
relations in terms of a restriction tha t anaphoric dependencies are governed by a 
precedence requirement, --an approach partly similar to Chomsky's "leftness" 
condition. Thus in the case of the WCO configuration in (37), the pronoun cannot 
be dependenton its pu ta tive  antecedent everyone because this antecedent does not 
precede it:
(37) His mother likes everyone
Williams account of W CO will fo llow  from the Precedence requirement proposed 
here if it is generalized in the obvious way: the restriction of Precedence to 
structural dependencies needs to be removed so that it constrains all syntactic 
dependencies. (Notice th a t to preserve earlier results, Totality and Non-redundancy 
must not be similarly generalized, they must remain conditions on structural 
dependencies.)
(38) Precedence (Generalized)
if x depends on y then the terminals dominated by y precede 
the terminals dominated by x
Given a copy theo ry  of chains, the more complex, reconstruction cases of 
WCO w ill also fall out on the assumption that the bound pronoun must depend on 
an antecedent in A -position. (See Brody to appear, for arguments for a theory 
where all copies in a chain are present simultaneously at LF).
(39) W ho does his m other like (who)
(40) ? W hich picture o f w hich artist does his mother like (which picture
of which artist)
(41) W hich of his p ictures does every painter like best (which of his pictures)
In (40), where the antecedent is "reconstructed", no V-chain and no accessibility 
condition (Higginbotham 1983) is necessary. The antecedent in the copy position 
is to the right of the pronoun. (41), where the pronominal is "reconstructed" is 
correctly allowed on the  assumption tha t an anaphoric element in a chain needs to 
satisfy its dependency conditions in only one of its positions in the chain (Barrs 
1986, Chomsky 1993), -h e re  the copy position.
W illiams generalizes his treatm ent of WCO as involving a dependency 
governed by precedence to  other anaphoric relations including the relation between
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a pronoun and its nonquantificational antecedent. Since the generalized Precedence 
principle o f the dependency theory proposed here is identical to W illiam s' 
assumption about the restriction governing these cases it should be clear tha t the 
present account can be similarly generalized.
Consider in contrast principle C of the binding theory. This is not a restriction 
on antecedence/dependence but rather a disjointness requirement. For example in
(42) coreference between he and the object John is prohibited whether or not there 
is an alternative antecedent for the pronoun.
(42) *(Johnx's mother said that )hex thought I liked Johnx.
Therefore the present theory predicts that principle C must be stated in term s of c- 
command and that this principle will show no binary branching or precedence 
effects. Thus the fact tha t it does not require disjointness in the well know n cases 
of (43a,b) is as expected if the adjunct and the extraposed clause are in a high 
enough position in which the pronoun does not c-command the name tha t the 
clause includes:
(43) a. We sent himx there in order to please Johnx's mother 
b. Someone had phoned herx who Maryx met at the party
Again, as is well known, there is independent evidence from constituency 
tests tha t there exists a VP in (43) that does not include the sentence final clauses, 
hence also for the claim that the pronoun indeed fails to c-command the elements 
contained in these clauses. Final clauses like the ones in (43) can be le ft stranded 
by VP-deletion as (44) and (45) exemplifies, and sentential adjuncts can also be 
stranded by VP-fronting, as in (46):
(44) A lthough none of the MEN did who were visiting from NEW YORK, several
o f the WOMEN w ent to the concert who were visiting from BOSTON
(Culicover and Rochemont 1990)
(45) a. MARY sent him there in order to PLEASE John's mother and KLARA did
in order to UPSET her.
b. Although MARY did in order to UPSET John's mother, KLARA sent him 
there in order to PLEASE her.
(46) ...and send him there Klara did, in order to please John's mother
Sentential adjuncts like the in order to clause in (43a) behave like the locative 
and temporal adjuncts and the Heavy Shifted elements considered earlier: under an 
anaphoric dependency like WCO they act as if they were embedded more deeply 
in the tree:
(47) W hox did you criticize tx in order to please himx
As usual w ith  configurations where an element on the right is in a higher position 
examples can be constructed that exhibit both configurational and dependency 
relations simultaneously, creating an apparent contradiction. (48) fo r example
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vio lates neither WCO (a dependency effect) nor principle C:
(48) a. W hox did you talk to t x about hery before M aryy told himx not to listen
b. I sent each boyx to hery in order to make M aryy meet himx
It has been suggested tha t principle C can be stated on binary branching 
trees. But judgements on examples like (49) are quite equivocal:
(49) a. Sue spoke to himx about Billx's mother
b. Sue spoke to Mary about himx in Billx's house
The slight unacceptability of these could be due to the infelicitious repetition of an 
R-expression presupposed in the context. The difference between a violation of this 
weaker prohibition against repeating an R-expression and genuine principle C effects 
is illustrated by (50) and (51). (50), which violates the weaker, presumably 
pragmatic, prohibition contrasts w ith the more strongly ungrammatical (51) tha t 
vio lates principle C:
(50) ?Bill's mother spoke to Bill
(51) * Bill spoke to Bill's mother
(52) a. Sue spoke to Billx about Billx's mother
b. Sue spoke to Mary about Billx in Billx's house
The examples in (52) appear to be on a par w ith (50) rather than (51), reinforcing 
the conclusion tha t principle C is not sensitive to precedence in the same way as 
principle A or WCO is. Thus it is not a principle stateable on binary branching trees. 
As noted, the present approach predicts this result: since principle C is not a 
dependency principle it w ill not constrain dependencies and should therefore be 
sensitive to standard c-command.
Notice tha t the present approach entails also tha t wherever there is subject 
ob ject asymmetry w ith  respect to principle C, the subject must be outside the 
(lowest) VP tha t contains the object: otherwise there can be no asymmetry effects.
Haider (1993, 1994) who proposes a version of the binary branching 
hypothesis notes problems w ith  stating principle C on such trees. He then argues 
tha t principle C is not a structural principle at all, he claims that it could not be 
stated on non-binary branching trees either. He questions the account of (43b) tha t 
assumes that the relative clause extraposed from subject is in a high enough 
position in the tree where the object does not c-command it. Many of his 
arguments do not distinguish between various types of extraposition constructions. 
I shall look briefly below at some of those that are relevant to the question of the 
position of the extraposed clause in extraposition from DP constructions. His main 
argum ent is tha t extraposed relatives always precede an extraposed argument 
clause and object pronouns must be disjoint from any R-expression in the argument 
clause:
(53) Someone has told herx [who Maryx met] [that M ary„x will inherit the castle]
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If the pronoun in (53) must c-command the extraposed argum ent clause then there 
is no way to avoid it c-commanding the extraposed relative. Since no disjointness 
e ffect obtains w ith  the R-expression in the relative this appears to question the 
possibility o f a structural account of principle C.
There is strong evidence however that extraposed object argument clauses 
originate under the VP, as originally proposed by Stowell 1982 (see also Postal 
1986, Pesetsky 1992). If we take this extraposition to be A '-m ovem ent, then 
principle C should hold for the VP-internal position, just like in the case o f (54) it 
holds for the source position:
(54) *[W hich claim that Johnx was asleep] do you think hex denied t
Hence (53) in fact creates no problems. It's structure is like (55), where the 
pronoun c-commands the R-expression in the appropriate position in the chain of 
the extraposed argument clause, but fails to c-command the R-expression in the 
extraposed relative whose structural position is higher:
(55) Someone has told [VP herx [that M ary.x w ill...] ][who M aryx met] [that M ary will
inherit the castle]
(Martina W iltschko points out that when the R-expression is in a relative 
clause inside the extraposed object argument clause, the example improves. If 
correct, this provides further evidence for the analysis suggested here. Since non- 
selected arguments (adjuncts) like the relative clause reconstruct only optionally 
(Lebaux 1989), the contrast between this case and (53) would be predicted on the 
reconstruction analysis proposed -cf. Brody to appear.)
Another set of arguments against adjoining the extraposed relative clause 
higher than the VP and thus against the possibility o f a structural account of 
principle C predicated on non-binary branching trees involves binding facts.
(56) I would not tell everyonex all the details at once [that hex might be
interested in]
Haider argues tha t in (56) the trace of the quantifier must c-command the pronoun, 
otherw ise the structure would give rise to a WCO violation. It would fo llo w  from 
this tha t the extraposed clause must be not higher in the tree than the complements 
o f the verb, making a structural explanation of the fact tha t an R-expression in an 
extraposed relative can be object bound impossible. But as we have seen, WCO is 
a dependency principle, hence it provides no evidence for the c-command relations 
involving the extraposed clause.
Arguing against Culicover and Rochemont's IP-adjunction analysis, Haider 
shows tha t restrictive relatives cannot take antecedents split between elements in 
tw o  co-ordinate clauses:
(57) * l 'l l  in terview  everyone and tape every man here who know  each o ther
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very well
He takes th is to be evidence for the s tric tly  right branching analysis. If the clause 
is embedded in the VP o f the  second conjunct then it cannot be construed w ith an 
element in the first con junct which does not c-command it. But the example 
indicates only that the restrictive relative is not IP-adjoined, since the 
ungrammaticality of (57) fo llows as long as the clause is VP-internal. It does not 
matter fo r th is explanation how deeply the clause is embedded in the VP.
I conclude that Haider's cases raise no d ifficu lty  for the structural account 
o f principle C. This can be maintained, as long as trees are not strictly binary 
branching. Principle C thus  continues to provide additional evidence for the 
necessity o f a non-binary branching phrase structure analysis.
III. Summary and Conclusion
Two types o f relations have recently been argued to have ordering consequences 
for syntactic  categories. Kayne (1993) argued that asymmetric c-command relation 
correlates s tric tly  with the order of terminals, while W illiams (1992) has revived the 
idea tha t anaphoric dependency entails precedence. An important argument in 
favour o f the dependency theory proposed here that it reduces these tw o separate 
ordering principles to one.
I argued in the firs t part of this paper that given a dependency module the 
theory o f phrase structure can be radically simplified. Since the asymmetry of spec 
and comp and also specifiers and complements is provided by this module, this 
asym m etry does not need to  be expressed by the phrase structure. I proposed that 
the theory o f phrase structu re  consists essentially of the the assumption tha t heads 
project under a condition of locality (immediate domination). This entailed 
biuniqueness of the re lation between heads and phrases projected by them. I 
proposed tha t there is no adjunction to  phrases and no intermediate projection 
levels. Labeling of phrases becomes unnecessary. The GPP and the PPP ensure that 
phrases cannot adjoin to  heads and tha t non chain root heads are always head- 
internal.
In the second part o f the paper I showed that dependency theory can do the 
w ork o f binary branching phrase structure analyses. There is systematic evidence 
against binary branching analyses from constituency tests as Pesetsky stressed, 
and as we have seen above also from the disjointness requirement o f principle C. 
Pesetsky's dual system achieves descriptive adequacy here at the cost of 
accounting fo r the data by a complex two-faced system. Dependency theory 
provides a modular alternative: it offers a solution where the evidence fo llows from 
the interaction of two conceptually d is tinct and simple subtheories.
Dependency theory appears preferable to the dual derivation analysis for a 
number o f more specific reasons. First since dependency theory is an annotation 
it avoids duplicate selectional and other contextual statements and correspondence
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principles o f the dual derivation system. Secondly, dependency theory is more 
parsimonious also in that it postulates only the operative relations of the binary 
branching structures: the spec-head and head-comp relations. Thirdly, since 
dependency theory postulates an asymmetry between the spec and the comp o f a 
head, it has independent motivation in that it makes it possible to  reduce the theory 
o f phrase structure to the minimal projectional requirement. Lastly, dependency 
theory is more restrictive in that it provides a classification o f syntactic relations: 
it predicts that binary branching/precedenceeffects will only be exhibited by various 
types of dependencies.
Let me finally turn to an additional argument from co-ordination fo r a 
dependency module. Constituents in Pesetsky's cascade structures correspond in 
dependency terms to a unit that contains a category (the spec or the head o f the 
cascade constituent) together w ith all its (direct and indirect) dependents. Thus co­
ordination of cascade constituents generally correpond to co-ordination o f some 
category together w ith all its direct and indirect dependents. As Pesetsky notes 
there are some recalcitrant cases of co-ordination however where the co-ordinated 
elements do not form constituents under anybody's analysis:
(58) Mary w ill give [some books to John] and [some records to  Bill] in the garden
on Tuesday
Dependency structures provide the appropriate units for this type of co-ordination, 
tha t neither standard nor binary branching trees offer. Given the dependency 
analysis, we can take co-ordination in general to operate on a category C together 
w ith  all categories that structurally depend on C. These sets of dependent 
categories w ill correspond to constituents under the binary branching analysis. To 
allow  cases like (58) we can assume in addition that (spec-head) dependencies 
thatare semantically empty can behave as if they were not present, that is th a t they 
can be optionally ignored in the determination of the structural dependents o f a 
category. Thus in (58) the spec-head dependency between Bill and in can be 
ignored and if it is then the phrase "some records" w ill have only to and Bill as its 
structural dependents. Hence "some records to Bill" can be a conjunct o f co­
ordination.
Appendix
Chomsky (1994) provides a different explanation of the effects o f the GPP. In this 
appendix I shall comment on his approach. Chomsky does not discuss the problem 
of w hy the selectional (thematic etc.) requirements of heads have to be satisfied 
in the root position of their chain. This problem can be reduced to the question of 
w hy categorial projection is always in the root position on the assumption tha t only 
projecting heads can select. Let us make this assumption. Then one can distinguish 
tw o  types of GPP effects. One effect of the GPP is that (i) categorial projection is 
always in the root position and another consequence as we have seen is th a t (ii) 
selectional (thematic) properties are always satisfied by root positions.
It is possible to th ink of (i) as creating four separate questions, (ii) adding one more:
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(59) a. W hy cannot a head in a substituted nonchain-root position
project?
b. W hy cannot a head in an adjoined nonchain-root position 
project?
c. W hy cannot an XP in a substituted nonchain-root position 
pro ject further?
d. W hy cannot an XP in an adjoined nonchain-root position 
pro ject further?
(60) W hy is movement to  a selected (theta) position prohibited?
Chomsky provides the fo llow ing answers to these questions.
(59a.b). —heads in non root position cannot project: This is because the HMC would 
force such a raised head oc to substitute into or adjoin to the ocP , the phrase oc 
itself projected. This is prohibited by the fact that such "self attachm ent" would 
create an ambiguity: it is not clear in such structures if the category/segment that 
dominates oc in the non root position inherits its label ( ocP)  from oc in the non root 
position or from  the ocP tha t oc projected in its root position. (In the "o ffic ia l" bare 
phrase structure notation tha t Chomsky proposes the resulting category would be 
{ oc, { oc , K } }  for substitution, and { <  oc , oc > ,  { oc, K } }  for adjunction.).
(59c). —substituted non-heads cannot project: Turning to the question of why non 
heads ie. phrases cannot project further in non chain root positions, the substitution 
case is ruled out by the principle of Greed. Greed states that "M ove raises oc only 
if morphological properties o f oc itself would not be satisfied in the derivation". In 
a configuration like (61) if XP* raises to  spec Y and then projects XP + , then XP* 
ceases to  be a maximal projection, given the relational definition o f projectional 
status.
(61) M XP+ XPx* [Y. tx j]
But then X P * will be "invisib le for the computational system ", which only sees non 
projected elements and maximal projections and therefore cannot "enter into a 
checking relation"
There is an additional reason fo r the ungrammaticality o f (61), namely the 
Uniform ity Condition, according to w h ich  a "chain is uniform w ith  regard to phrase 
structure status", "w here the "phrase structure status" of an element is its 
(relational) property of maximal, minimal or neither". This also rules out (61) since 
here the trace of XP* is maximal (by hypothesis) but XP* is not.
(59b.d), -ad jo ined heads cannot project and non-heads (phrases) cannot project 
further:
An adjoined element tha t projects w ould create the fo llow ing configuration:
(62) * [ .  « „  [K t x ]
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Chomsky assumes that the two-segm ent category in adjunction involves tw o  
elements tha t have the status of a category: the lower segment and the tw o  
segments together. On this assumption Full Interpretation is violated in (62). 
W hichever of the tw o  categories, oc or the two-segm ent element [ oc, cc] is taken 
to be the head of the chain whose root is tx , the other element receives no 
interpretation at LF and thus violates FI. Chomsky "conclude[sj that the target 
must have projected". Taking [o c ,  oc] to be the head of the chain is ruled out 
additionally by the UC. (This seems to me to work only where oc is non-maximal, 
if oc is maximal then the UC is not violated.)
(60), -  the MTC effect of the GPP:
Chomsky attributes this also to the principle of Greed, the DP John in (63) cannot 
raise to spec-VP to pick up the unassigned theta role, since it does not need to do 
so to satisfy its own requirements.
(63) a. John [VP t ' [HIT t ]]
b. John [VP t ' [BELIEVE [t to VP]]]
Even if the DP originates in a non-theta position Greed would prevent raising to a 
theta position on the assumption that "the need for a theta role is not a formal 
property, like Case, that permits "last resort" movement".
Let me now  enumerate some problematic aspects of Chomsky's account o f GPP 
effects:
(a) It is not clear why the ambiguity of "self attachm ent" cases of adjoined and 
substituted projecting head should create a violation. Am biguity o f structures does 
not generally lead to ungrammaticality.
There is an additional case of adjoined non-root heads to consider for which 
the prohibition concerning self-attachment is not relevant, -nam e ly  where the head 
oc in the non-root position is adjoined to another head. This is the usual 
configuration o f head chains and thus cannot be excluded in general, oc in this 
adjoined non root position of course cannot project either. But it is not clear w hat 
excludes here the configuration where the moved element projects instead of the 
head to which it adjoined.
(b) The raised XP in (61) could satisfy Greed before it projects (c f.:"A d junction  to 
X ' by merger does not conflic t w ith  the conclusion that X ' is invisible to [the 
com putational system of the grammar]; at the point of adjunction, the target is an 
XP, not X '."  p.32.) So at the "po in t of substitution" the raised element is a maximal 
projection, not an X '.
(c) Under Chomsky's bare PS system a category can be both a minimal and a 
maximal projection (eg. it or John in "John saw it"). So a category does not obey 
the spirit o f the UC. Although this creates no serious technical problem, it is unclear 
conceptually w hy a chain, a set o f categories, should then be constrained by this
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condition.
(d) The UC would exclude word-internal head adjunction, so this configuration must 
be exempted: "a t LF X° is subm itted to independent word interpretation processes, 
W l" where Wl ignores principles like UC. "W l is something like the LF analogue of 
M orpho logy..." Little independent evidence exists for the otherwise interesting 
concept of LF analogue to Morphology.
(e) The fact tha t in adjunction structures there is only one LF role for the tw o 
segm ent category [K,K] and the category corresponding to the lower segment, K 
is a general problem in adjunction, whichever category projects. To allow  adjunction 
to heads Chomsky invokes W l: the relevant restrictions again do not hold word 
internally. For non-heads he suggests that this fact essentially restricts adjunction 
to nonthem atic categories (plus some other restricted cases, see also above in 
section I.3.). But if Wl can neutralize the problem when a minimal projection oc 
adjoins to X and X projects, Wl w ill also neutralize the problem if oc projects. Hence 
the conclusion that the non root element cannot project does not fo llow .
Similar comments hold for nonminimal projections. If a configuration in which 
the ta rget o f adjunction is in a nonthematic position is permitted because no 
problem arises w ith FI, then in the same kind of position the adjoined element 
should be able to project w ithou t violating this principle. This again is probably an 
incorrect result.
Additionally, the assumption that there are exactly three elements in 
adjunction structures w ith the status of a category seems somewhat stipulative. 
Even granting tha t assumption, further questions arise. For example it is not clear 
w hy oc and [oc, a ]  could not jo in tly  serve as the antecedent of the trace.
(f) The explanation of the MTC based on Greed does not seem general enough. The 
prohib ition against movement to  theta positions holds also for theta positions that 
are a t the same time also Case positions. To illustrate, consider the hypothetical 
preposition ON, which is like "on" except that it does not assign Case. This should 
a llow  a structure like (64).
(64) a. I gave John Sunday ON t (cf. I gave John a book on Sunday)
The MTC and the GPP which entails it, predict that such structures are 
ungrammatical and that therefore prepositions like ON cannot exist. The explanation 
based on Greed does not have this consequence, unless not only structural Case 
positions but all Case positions are taken to be systematically d istinct from theta 
positions.
(g) The Greed based account allows movement to a theta position when this is 
made necessary by some other principle. This again seems to be an incorrect 
prediction. For example Relativized M inimality /Minimal Chain Link Condition (MCL) 
can force movement through a theta position in a derivation in which a later step 
satisfies Greed. To see this consider first Chomsky's analysis of the
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ungrammaticality of (65):
(65) *John reads often books
(66) [VP John [v. v [VP/2 often [v. reads books]]]]
He suggests tha t (65) has the structure in (66), and this is ruled out since the 
adverbial in spec-VP/2 prevents raising of the object books to spec-AgrO. "Note the 
crucial assumption that the subject John is in [SPEC, VP]... otherw ise that position 
would be an "escape hatch" for the raising of books", p.33.
Consider in this light (67), that contains the verb HIT that assigns no accusative but 
is otherw ise like hit, - th e  case that violates the MTC:
(67) John [vp t [VP/2often HITs t ]]
Here the DP John must raise outside the VP in order to get Case. But then as we 
have seen in the case of (65), relativized minimality/MCL forces it through [SPEC, 
VP] where it can pick up the subject theta role. Thus the nonexistence of a verb like 
HIT is not predicted.
In sum there are a number of uncertainties and unsolved problems associated w ith  
Chomsky's approach to the GPP effects. But the most im portant general objection 
is probably the familiar one w ith  this type of approach that accounts for a major 
and simple generalization in terms of a complex conspiracy of principles. Such an 
approach appears plausible where the generalisation in question has a set o f 
exceptions in need of an explanation: then the conspiracy can explain w hy the 
apparent generalization is true exactly for the cases for which it is. But a conspiracy 
account of a major and apparently unexceptional generalization makes the 
implausible and methodologically objectionable claim that the generalization is a — 
highly im probable- accident. (Chomsky does not appear to question the claim tha t 
the generalization of the GPP is exceptionless. Boskovic 1993 points out cases 
apparently problematic for the MTC. These could not be used to support Chom sky's 
analysis however, since they would create further problems for it. See however 
Brody to appear, for an alternative analysis of Boscovic's cases that maintains the 
MTC and thus the GPP in full generality.)
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